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HEY AMERICA! LET’S GET SMART: 
THE NEED FOR A RELIABLE MODERN 
SMART ELECTRICAL GRID RESISTANCE 
TO CYBERATTACKS 
Richard J. Kisielowski II* 
“If Alexander Graham Bell returned to Earth today, the progress in telecommunica-
tions over the last 125 years would be mystifying. If Thomas Edison came back today, 
not only would he recognize our electricity system, he could probably fix it [when 
problems arise].” 
  —Robert Catell, chairman of the New York State Smart Grid Consortium1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, much of America’s infrastructure is falling into disrepair and inci-
dents of failure are increasing at alarming rates.2 Thousands of miles of Ameri-
can roadways are crumbling and riddled with potholes;3 thousands of bridges 
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America: Columbus School of Law, 2016; 
M.S. Public Policy, Drexel University: College of Arts & Sciences - Center for Public Poli-
cy, 2011; B.A. Politics; Business & Economics, Ursinus College, 2010. I would like to 
thank the hard work and input from the editors of COMMLAW CONSPECTUS, Volume 23 as 
well as the editors and associates of the CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECH-
NOLOGY, Volume 24. I would also like to thank Professor Christopher W. Savage for his 
time and input on my paper from the beginning. I would lastly like to thank my friends, my 
family, and my professors for their support and encouragement throughout the research and 
writing process. 
 1 David Biello, The Start-Up Pains of a Smarter Electricity Grid, SCI. AM. (May 10, 
2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/start-up-pains-of-smart-grid/. 
 2 See, e.g., Gary Stoller, U.S. Roads, Bridges Are Decaying Despite Stimulus Influx, 
USA TODAY (Jul. 29, 2013, 12:13 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/28/roads-bridges-decaying/2594499/ 
(“Indeed, just 38% of the pavement on roads stretching miles across the USA is in “good” 
condition, according to the analysis, while about one in 10 of the nation’s bridges are ‘struc-
turally deficient.’”); Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes: Falling Apart: America’s Neglected Infra-
structure (CBS television broadcast Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/falling-
apart-america-neglected-infrastructure/; The Water-Infrastructure Gap, SUSTAINABLE WA-
TER, http://sustainablewater.com/the-water-infrastructure-gap (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). 
 3 See Christopher Ingraham, Where America’s Worst Roads Are — And How Much 
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are closed annually citing safety concerns;4 miles and miles of water pipes are 
rupturing everyday.5 One of the glaring illustrations is the poor condition of 
America’s energy infrastructure.6 The American Society of Civil Engineers7 
assessed the United States’ electrical power grid and network and gave the sys-
tem a “D+” grade in its most recent 2013 Report Card for American Infra-
                                                                                                             
They’re Costing Us, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/06/25/why-driving-on-americas-
roads-can-be-more-expensive-than-you-think. 
The shoddy state of the nation’s roads cost the average driver $515 in extra operation 
and maintenance costs on their car, according to the latest analysis from TRIP, a na-
tional transportation research group…The numbers from TRIP show that 28 percent 
of the nation’s major roadways—interstates, freeways, and major arterial roadways 
in urban areas—are in “poor” condition. This means they have so many major ruts, 
cracks and potholes that they can’t simply be resurfaced–they need to be completely 
rebuilt. 
Id.; see also generally Bridging the Gap: America’s Crumbling Infrastructure, THE ECONO-
MIST, Jun. 28, 2014, at 23-24, http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21605932-
country-where-everyone-drives-america-has-shoddy-roads-bridging-gap (discussing de-
creased national budget cuts and spending on infrastructure). 
 4 See Mike Baker & Joan Lowy, Bridge Safety: Many U.S. Spans Are Old, Risky and 
Rundown, HUFF. POST (Nov. 16, 2013, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/16/bridge-safety_n_3933317.html (“An Associated 
Press analysis of 607,380 bridges in the most recent federal National Bridge Inventory 
showed that 65,605 were classified as structurally deficient and 20,808 as fracture critical. 
Of those, 7,795 had both red flags.”). 
 5 ALEX PRUD’HOMME, THE RIPPLE EFFECT: THE FATE OF FRESHWATER IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 356-57 (2011). 
In the United States, some 240,000 water pipes burst every year, according to the 
EPA [Environmental Protection Agency]. By another estimate, from the USGS 
[United States Geological Survey], 650 water mains break every day—at a rate of 
one every 2 minutes…Many municipal water pipes are fifty to a hundred years old; 
some were built at the time of the [American] Civil War . . . 
Id. 
 6 See generally Patrick J. Kiger, ‘American Blackout’: Four Major Real-Life Threats to 
the Electric Grid, NAT’L GEO. (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2013/10/25/american-blackout-four-major-real-
life-threats-to-the-electric-grid/ (outlining the effects of various enemy attacks on the exist-
ing U.S. electrical grid). 
 7 AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, 2013 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 1 
(2013), http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/documents/2013-Report-Card.pdf [herein-
after ASCE, 2013 REPORT CARD]. 
The American Society of Civil Engineers, founded in 1852, is the country’s oldest 
national civil engineering organization. It represents more than 140,000 civil engi-
neers in private practice, government, industry, and academia who are dedicated to 
advancing the science and profession of civil engineering…ASCE advances profes-
sional knowledge and improves the practice of civil engineers as the focus point for 
development of research results and technical, policy, and managerial information. 
As such ASCE serves as the catalyst for effective and efficient service through co-
operation with other engineering and related organizations. 
Id. 
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structure.8 This report specifically noted that the antiquated grid has become 
increasingly vulnerable to physical and electronic sabotage, and is further sty-
mied by delayed enactment of improvements and limited funding.9 Related 
sentiments and alarming calls for action have also been echoed in reports made 
by the U.S. Department of Energy,10 U.S. Department of Homeland Security,11 
the private sector,12 and reports made to the United States Congress.13 
America is rapidly approaching a vital turning point. Within the next ten 
years, many elements within the American electrical power grid system will 
begin to hit their equipment life expectancies and, therefore, will be working 
beyond their originally intended design life and capacity.14 Additionally, in-
                                                
 8 Id. at 60. 
 9 See generally id. at 62-64 (“Over three times as many low-voltage line projects. . . 
were delayed in 2011, compared to high voltage lines. The result is that while new transmis-
sion lines are needed, many are being delayed due to permitting issues.”) 
 10 See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Department Releases New 
Guidance for Strengthening Cybersecurity of the Grid’s Supply Chain (Apr. 30, 2014) (on 
file at http://energy.gov/articles/energy-department-releases-new-guidance-strengthening-
cybersecurity-grid-s-supply-chain) (“The new guidance released today focuses on helping 
utilities and other energy sector organizations purchase technologies that include cybersecu-
rity protections and features – improving the overall reliability and security of energy deliv-
ery systems and ensuring that the testing, manufacturing, delivery, and installation of new 
technologies emphasize cybersecurity requirements.”). 
 11 See generally Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/csd-tcipg (last visited Apr. 3, 
2015). 
The Nation’s electric power infrastructure, which depends on the health of an under-
lying computing and communication network, is at serious risk from both malicious 
cyber attacks and accidental failures. These risks may come from cyber hackers who 
gain access to control networks or create denial of service attacks on the networks 
themselves, or from accidental causes, such as natural disasters or operator errors. 
Id. 
 12 See, e.g., Massoud Amin, Turning the Tide on Outages 2, 10-11 (Jul. 18, 2011) (un-
published manuscript) (on file at http://massoud-
amin.umn.edu/publications/Turning_the_Tide_on_Outages_MA_Draft_07-18-2011.pdf) 
(“[T]he North American electricity infrastructure is vulnerable to increasing stresses from 
several sources…The present power delivery infrastructure cannot adequately handle those 
new demands of high-end digital customers and 21st century economy. It cannot support 
levels of security, quality, reliability, and availability needed for economic prosperity”). 
 13 See PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43604, PHYSICAL SECURITY OF 
THE U.S. POWER GRID: HIGH-VOLTAGE TRANSFORMER SUBSTATIONS 2 (2014). 
The various parts of the electric power system are all vulnerable to failure due to 
natural or manmade events. However…HV [high voltage] transformers are consid-
ered by many experts to be the most vulnerable to intentional damage from mali-
cious acts. Congress has long been concerned about grid security in general, but re-
cent security exercises, together with a 2013 physical attack on transformers in 
Metcalf, [California], have focused congressional interest on the physical security of 
HV transformers, among other specific aspects of the grid. 
Id. 
 14 RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41886, THE SMART GRID AND CY-
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creasing threats of cyberattacks by mischievous hackers and terrorists are a 
clear and present danger to the electrical grid—the nation’s primary source of 
electricity.15 Malicious computer and electronic viruses, like that of “Stuxnet,”16 
have already been used against other nations, which clearly illustrates the vul-
nerability of infrastructure to cyberattacks.17 The system also unnecessarily 
risks the current “American Way of Life” as we know it today.18 This is a criti-
cally important issue due to the essential role that reliable energy plays in our 
economy, society, and readiness at home.19 As a result, this Comment advo-
cates that America must prioritize the modernization of its electrical grid and 
implement a resilient smart electrical power grid that can intelligently handle 
the future demands of this nation. 
It is widely recognized that the deployment of smart grid technologies will 
                                                                                                             
BERSECURITY— REGULATORY POLICY AND ISSUES 2 (2011) [hereinafter CAMPBELL, SMART 
GRID & CYBERSECURITY]. 
Much of the infrastructure which serves the U.S. power grid is aging. The average 
age of power plants is now over 30 years; most of these facilities were originally de-
signed to last 40 years. Electric transmission and distribution system components are 
similarly aging, with power transformers averaging over 40 years of age, and 70% of 
transmission lines being 25 years or older. 
Id. 
 15 See KIM ZETTER, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO DAY: STUXNET AND THE LAUNCH OF THE 
WORLD’ FIRST DIGITAL WEAPON 371 (2014) [hereinafter ZETTER, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO 
DAY]. 
Just as we failed in the past to invest in the physical infrastructure of our roads, 
bridges, and railways, we have failed to invest in the security of our digital infra-
structure, [paraphrasing what President Barack H.] Obama said. Cyber intruders, he 
warned, had already probed our electrical grid, and in other countries had plunged 
entire cities into darkness. “This Status quo is no longer acceptable,” he said, “not 
when there’s so much at stake.” 
Id. 
 16 Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon, 
WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-
stuxnet/ (“Stuxnet, as it came to be known, was unlike any other [computer] virus or worm 
that came before. Rather than simply hijacking targeted computers or stealing information 
from them, it escaped the digital realm to wreak physical destruction on equipment the 
computers controlled.”). 
 17 Doug Nibbelink, Protecting Critical Infrastructure Against the Next Stuxnet 7-8 (Mar. 
13, 2013) (unpublished M.S. dissertation paper, Davenport University) (on file with author). 
 18 See generally America’s Crumbling Infrastructure and How to Fix It: Hearing Before 
the J. Econ. Comm. of the U.S. Cong., 113th Cong. 2, 5 (2013), 
http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/48fc2638-4bba-4611-807a-
5871e6fb4690/rendell-testimony-embargoed-until-930am-on-july-24-2013-.pdf [hereinafter 
Hearing] (statement of Edward G. Rendell, former Governor of Pennsylvania). 
 19 See generally DANIEL YERGIN & SAMANTHA GROSS, WORLD ECON. FORUM, ENERGY 
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH: ENERGY DIVISION UPDATE 2012, at 7-10 (2012), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_EN_EnergyEconomicGrowth_IndustryAgenda_2012.
pdf. 
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produce substantial benefits for the management and operation of the distribu-
tion of electrical power in the United States.20 However, reliance on smart elec-
trical grid technology and infrastructure creates issues regarding the security of 
the system against penetration by unauthorized users and from cyberattacks.21 
Current federal legislation and oversight, last updated in 2007, is unimpressive, 
largely ineffective, and does not adequately address the need to rapidly imple-
ment smart grid technology. Notably, Congress has done little more, in con-
crete terms, than to establish a simple public policy statement supporting a 
modern electrical power grid, where digital data will be used to “improve reli-
ability, security, and efficiency of the electric grid.”22 
Congress has not expanded on this statement or provided a cohesive frame-
work to ensure adequate oversight and simplified implementation; leaving in 
its wake, a statement that is too broad and deprived of any specific benchmarks 
for redevelopment moving forward.23 Since 2007, various members of Con-
gress have proposed legislative actions or called for hearings,24 but efforts in 
previous Congresses have ultimately stalled.25 Congress must therefore revisit 
this issue with the goal of enacting effective legislation that outlines our na-
tion’s electrical power grid and establishes concrete benchmarks to ensure we 
have a resilient system. 
This Comment will analyze legal and public policy issues affecting Ameri-
ca’s current electrical grid, both as it presently exists and as it will exist after 
expected modernization efforts. Part I will discuss the key components of the 
electrical power grid and its modernization. Part II will examine the principal 
laws currently in place governing the grid at the federal level. Part III will dis-
cuss problems and failings with the current laws and oversight regime and ar-
gue how this regime constrains the nation’s ability to modernize the grid and 
improve its resiliency against real and present threats. Part IV will propose 
changes to current law and policies that would facilitate creation of a stronger 
smart electrical grid, including identifying the roles of key players, who should 
have a significant role in this new enforcement and oversight scheme. Finally, 
                                                
 20 Smart Grid, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/services /technology-
development/smart-grid (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). 
 21 ISAAC GHANSAH, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CEC-500-2012-047, SMART GRID CYBER 
SECURITY, POTENTIAL THREATS, VULNERABILITIES AND RISKS 8-9 (2012), 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2012publications/CEC-500-2012-047/CEC-500-2012-047.pdf. 
 22 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 1301(1), 42 U.S.C. § 17381(1) 
(2012). 
 23 See, e.g., id. §§ 17381-17386. 
 24 See, e.g., Terrorism Prevention and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015, 
H.R. 85, 114th Cong. § 3  (2015). 
 25 See Rachel Huggins, Pollster Urges GOP to Set ‘Positive Agenda’ In New Congress, 
THE HILL (Jan. 4, 2015, 7:00 AM) http://thehill.com/homenews/228424-pollster-urges-gop-
to-set-positive-agenda-in-new-congress. 
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Part V will evaluate the outlook, costs, and potential benefits of a renewed and 
improved electrical grid for the future and what this will mean moving ahead. 
II. BACKGROUND & OVERVIEW 
A. American Infrastructure Basics 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “infrastructure” as “[t]he underlying frame-
work of a system, [especially] public services and facilities…needed to support 
commerce as well as economic and residential development.”26 This definition 
includes facilities and utilities such as highways, bridges, sewers, and water 
systems,27 as well as systems supporting aviation, railways, seaports, pipelines, 
and electrical power systems.28 Most elements of infrastructure, including elec-
tricity, are critical components of industrialized economies; as such, these vital 
elements are no longer mere luxuries, but rather every-day necessities that 
support life, ensure safety, and foster convenience.29 
America invests in infrastructure very differently than most other nations, 
especially compared to those in Europe and Asia. Most European and Asian 
governments shift responsibility and cost to private sector businesses, making 
infrastructure projects joint undertakings within their societies.30 Meanwhile, in 
                                                
 26 Infrastructure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 27 Id. 
 28 ASCE, 2013 REPORT CARD, supra note 7, at 6-8. 
 29 See M.J. Logan, Generators: A Necessary Appliance for Every Household, NORWALL 
POWER SYS. (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.norwall.com/blog/news-and-updates/generators-
necessary-household-appliance (“In the beginning, electricity was an extravagant luxury 
used mainly for lighting. Later it became a convenience that was nice to have. Today, elec-
tricity is no longer a convenience, but a necessity. Homes depend on it to power various 
appliances that keep us and our property safe and secure.”); see generally Sarah Fenwick, 
Electricity Is A Human Right, Not a Luxury, LEGACY MAG. ONLINE, http://legacy-
magazine.eu/electricity-is-a-human-right-not-a-luxury (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (“I re-
main convinced that electricity is a human right and a necessity – not a luxury.”); Ashley 
Halsey III, Nation’s Aging Electrical Grid Needs Billions of Dollars in Investment, Report 
Says, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/nations-aging-electrical-grid-
needs-billions-of-dollars-in-investment-report-says/2012/04/26/gIQAEl12jT_story.html. 
 30 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFF. OF ECON POL’Y, EXPANDING OUR NATION’S INFRA-
STRUCTURE THROUGH INNOVATIVE FINANCING 4 (2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
cen-
ter/pressreleases/Documents/Expanding%20our%20Nation%27s%20Infrastructure%20thro
ugh%20Innovative%20Financing.pdf [hereinafter EXPANDING OUR NATION’S INFRASTRUC-
TURE]; see also generally Raffaele Della Croce & Juan Yermo, Institutional Investors and 
Infrastructure Financing 17 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. Working Papers on Fin., 
Ins., Private Pensions, Working Paper No. 36, 2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-
pensions/WP_36_InstitutionalInvestorsAndInfrastructureFinancing.pdf. 
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the United States, much of the infrastructure is largely funded and maintained 
by the government.31 Some scholars have remarked that America’s infrastruc-
ture development and management is remarkably socialist for an otherwise 
capitalist-centric country.32 Congress, Executive Branch agencies, and both 
state and local governments, often plan and fund the vast majority of various 
infrastructure projects across the country.33 Infrastructure projects are paid for 
at the federal level with tax revenues, while states and local governments fre-
quently use a combination of state tax revenues, federal funding programs, and 
various bonds issued to the public.34 
Notably, energy and electrical infrastructure funding varies slightly from 
general infrastructure funding. While some government monies go towards 
various improvement projects, a significant portion of financing comes from 
private entities, which comprise and operate various portions of the electrical 
grid.35 Other infrastructure entities that mirror this model include both tele-
communication providers and freight railway operators.36 For electrical grid 
development, it is estimated that some $18 billion was spent on upgrades and 
                                                                                                             
Over the last decades, public capital investment in infrastructure has on average de-
clined in OECD countries…As the share of government investment in infrastructures 
has declined that of private sector has increased, with privatizations being an im-
portant driver…New business models with private sector participation, variants of 
public-private partnership models (PPPs)—often using project finance technique—
have been increasingly used particularly in OECD countries, offering further scope 
for unlocking private sector capital and expertise. 
Id.; see also Fareed Zakaria, U.S. Needs an Infrastructure Bank, CNN: GLOBAL PUBLIC 
SQUARE (June 13, 2011, 12:50 PM), 
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/13/zakaria-u-s-needs-an-infrastructure-
bank/. 
 31 Zakaria, supra note 30. 
 32 Timothy B. Lee, We’re All Infrastructure Socialists, FORBES (May 24, 2012, 7:31 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2012/05/24/were-all-infrastructure-socialists/; 
Zakaria, supra note 30 (suggesting that the United States’ process for developing infrastruc-
ture is done in a socialist manner). 
 33 See, e.g., Zakaria, supra note 30; see also, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009 § 3, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115; see also generally Pennsylvania Infra-
structure Investment Authority Act §§ 961.1-961.12, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 751.1-751.20 
(2015). 
 34 EXPANDING OUR NATION’S INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 30, at 4-6. 
Americans have become accustomed to government provision of our roadway, trans-
it, water supply, and wastewater treatment systems, and private sector provision of 
electrical power, telecommunications, and freight rail…The line separating public 
from private infrastructure is not always clear. Even for infrastructure projects like 
roads and schools, which are traditionally owned by the public sector, state and local 
governments have long obtained private debt financing through a well-developed 
municipal bond market that is unique to the United States. 
Id. 
 35 See id. at 3. 
 36 Id. 
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modernization between the years 2010 and 2013.37 The federal government 
provided $8 billion towards this expenditure, with the energy sector funding 
the remainder.38 It is also helpful to explicitly note these numbers do not in-
clude repairs or otherwise standard maintenance.39 
B. The Current Electrical Power Grid in America 
The term “grid” is actually misleading to the extent that it implies a single 
cohesive network of power lines and facilities.40 In fact, the contiguous United 
States electrical grid is comprised of three separate sectors—the Eastern Inter-
connection, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, and the Western Inter-
connection.41 While these sectors adjoin one another, each is largely independ-
ent with little overlap in operation.42 There are also several different grid opera-
tors that manage and control the flow and wholesale costs of electricity within 
their sector of an interconnection.43 Within each region and interconnection, 
there are hundreds of different power-line networks, with more than 450,000 
miles of power lines throughout the United States.44 
The overall electrical grid is divided into three broad stages in which elec-
tricity must travel before reaching a given home, office, or school using the 
                                                
 37 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2014 SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT: REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 
(2014), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/08/f18/SmartGrid-SystemReport2014.pdf 
[hereinafter USDOE, 2014 SMART GRID REPORT] 
 38 Id. (noting that these years might ultimately become an outlier due to influx of gov-
ernment spending, which was the result of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, if further increase levels of government are ceased); see discussion infra Part II. 
 39 See USDOE, 2014 SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 37, at 2 (noting that the money 
was spent on smart grid deployment which is defined as digitally based sensing, communi-
cations, and control technologies and field devices). 
 40 See CHRISTOPHER GUO, CRAIG A. BOND, & ANU NARAYANAN, RAND CORP., THE 
ADOPTION OF NEW SMART-GRID TECHNOLOGIES: INCENTIVES, OUTCOMES, AND OPPORTUNI-
TIES 1 (2015), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR717.html (explaining that the 
US electric grid is made up of “three almost-independent subgrids”). 
 41 Id. at 1-2 (adding that the Electric Reliability Council of Texas is also colloquially 
known as the “Texas Interconnection”). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See generally PJM’s Role as an RTO, PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC (Apr. 27, 2015), 
https://www.pjm.com/aboutpjm/~/media/43A8E145FDFD4AFEB8D8D85873D2CE1C.ash
x (noting that regional transmission organizations are chief grid operating entities “author-
ized by the federal government to manage the reliability of the electric transmission system 
and the operation of the wholesale electricity market in a defined control area”). 
 44 AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, FAILURE TO ACT: THE IMPACT OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN-
VESTMENT ON AMERICA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH 19 (2011), 
http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Issues_and_Advocacy/Our_Initiatives/Infrastructure/Co
ntent_Pieces/failure-to-act-economic-impact-summary-report.pdf [hereinafter ASCE, FAIL-
URE TO ACT]. 
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electrical power grid system—generation, transmission, and distribution. First, 
electricity is generated at a power plant.45 Once generated, electricity enters 
transmission lines and is carried for a distance to various areas of population, 
whether that is to a nearby suburb or a faraway city or a lone rural farmstead.46 
Lastly, this electricity is delivered to the consumer via local power lines, called 
“distribution lines.”47 Deployed throughout this system are a large number of 
electrical substations, which either increase the voltage to carry the electricity 
over long distances or decrease and regulate the voltage for local distribution.48 
Generally, power must be consumed as it is being generated, for there is cur-
rently no readily available or practical system of storing large amounts of ex-
cess energy generated.49 
The United States’ current power grid was not the production of some mas-
ter plan, but rather, emerged as an elaborate “patchwork” of different compo-
nents.50 Each piece of equipment varies in the capacities it can handle as well 
as its current age and condition.51 The basic network of power plants, distribu-
tion lines, substations, and local power lines is virtually the same as the origi-
nal system created in the late 19th century, albeit on a much grander scale.52 
Currently, many of America’s 5,800 major power generation plants53 are now 
over thirty years old.54 These plants, however, were only designed to last for 
about forty years of use.55 Power transformers, used to convert the voltage of 
the electricity, average forty years old.56 Approximately 70% of transmission 
power lines have been in use for at least twenty-five years.57 Much of the grid 
is rapidly approaching its designed “life expectancy,” which, without moderni-
zation, will likely lead to an increasingly unreliable electrical system in Ameri-
ca.58  By only making incremental improvements to its electrical grid as vari-
ous elements and components continuously wear down and fail, the United 
                                                
 45 See CAMPBELL, SMART GRID & CYBERSECURITY, supra note 14, at 1. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. 
 48 CAMPBELL, SMART GRID & CYBERSECURITY, supra note 14, at 1 (noting that residen-
tial, commercial, and industrial all have different electricity requirements and specifications, 
even within each general type of users). 
 49 Id. (stating that technology has not yet reached the point where excess generated 
power can be stored on a wide, public scale). 
 50 ASCE, FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 44, at 19. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 CAMPBELL, SMART GRID & CYBERSECURITY, supra note 14, at 2. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Halsey III, supra note 29 (citing the ASCE, who stated that the nation’s electrical grid 
“will break down unless [at least] $673 billion is invested in it by 2020”). 
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States is playing a defensive game of catch-up. 
C. Transitioning to a “Smart” Electrical Power Grid 
“Smart grid” electricity has become a broad and ambiguous term used to 
generally define the next generation of electrical power network.59 This term 
frequently invokes the idea of utilizing digital data in real-time, two-way 
communications between consumers and their suppliers.60 Many advocates 
envision a practical and fully automated system, which is able to predict failure 
and quickly respond to various service issues and disruptions.61 Total smart 
grid technology would therefore work to completely revitalize and morph the 
electrical grid from how it exists presently.62 
Such an undertaking would require a massive modernization of equipment.63 
Power generating systems would need to be constructed and others would re-
quire retrofitting so that each accurately detects and reacts to consumer de-
                                                
 59 See GUO, ET AL., supra note 40, at iii (“This communication layer, its associated ena-
bling technologies, and the infrastructure necessary to deliver electricity are collectively 
known as the smart grid”); MARC W. CHUPKA, ROBERT EARLE, PETER FOX-PENNER, & RYAN 
HLEDIK, EDISON FOUND., TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S POWER INDUSTRY: THE INVESTMENT 
CHALLENGE 2010-2030, at xi n.7 (2008), 
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/Documents/Transforming_Americas_Power_Industry.p
df. 
There is currently no standard definition of “Smart Grid” within the electric utility 
industry ...The “Smart Grid” vision is that the technologies will: 1) provide custom-
ers with information and tools that allow them to be responsive to system conditions; 
2) ensure more efficient use of the electric grid; and 3) enhance system reliability. 
Id. 
 60 See, e.g., USDOE, 2014 SMART GRID REPORT , supra note 37, at v; CAMPBELL, 
SMART GRID & CYBERSECURITY, supra note 14, at V, 3; Michael Panfil, Resiliency+: Smart 
Grid Technologies and the Benefits of Two-Way Communication, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Sept. 
15, 2014), http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2014/09/15/resiliency-smart-grid-
technologies-and-the-benefits-of-two-way-communication/; BRANDON J. MURRILL, EDWARD 
C. LIU, & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42338, SMART METER DA-
TA: PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY 6 (2012). 
 61 See, e.g., USDOE, 2014 SMART GRID REPORT , supra note 37, at v (“Smart grid appli-
cations enable utilities to automatically locate and isolate faults to reduce outages, dynami-
cally optimize voltage and reactive power levels for more efficient power use, and monitor 
asset health to guide maintenance”); CAMPBELL, SMART GRID & CYBERSECURITY, supra note 
14, at 22 (noting smart grid could help mitigate the effects of natural disasters); Panfil, supra 
note 60 (noting smart meters would send out a “last gasp” call that would lead to better 
planning and response times of power outages); MURRILL, ET AL., supra note 60, at 1 (noting 
smart meters will allow suppliers to “collect, measure, and analyze energy consumption data 
for grid management, outage notification, and billing purposes”). 
 62 See generally ASCE, 2013 REPORT CARD, supra note 7, at 63. 
 63 GUO, ET AL., supra note 40, at xi. 
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mands.64 Modern transmission lines installed with monitoring equipment allow 
for automatic, instantaneous rerouting of electricity around service disruptions, 
both locally and regionally.65 The rollout and implementation of “intelligent 
substations,” which can evaluate electrical failures within the system and de-
termine when scheduled maintenance is needed, can prevent catastrophic and 
expensive equipment failures.66 This would result in vastly more efficient dis-
tribution networks that not only better protect the grid’s integrity and its con-
sumers, but also aims to be more energy efficient through storage or by pro-
ducing only the amount of energy needed.67 Eventually, the implantation of 
“smart meters” on consumer buildings will allow for a fully network intercon-
nect system through and through.68 
This Comment advocates upgrading the electrical grid, with a keen initial 
focus on transmission and distribution lines. Transmission and distribution 
lines, which lie between power plants and users,69 are likely to be the best seg-
ments to focus initial redevelopment. 70 Transmission and distributions lines are 
often considered the “backbone” of the system.71 This portion is likely the easi-
est to make modifications to since it does not involve consumer or personal 
privacy issues, like that of smart meters.72 Furthermore, this segment will likely 
be less contentious because the power lines are already largely in place; there-
                                                
 64 Id. at 37; see also Patricia A. Hoffman, How Synchrophasors are Bringing the Grid 
into the 21st Century, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Apr. 16, 2014, 12:10 PM), 
http://energy.gov/articles/how-synchrophasors-are-bringing-grid-21st-century (“A synchro-
phasor is a sophisticated [mailbox-sized] monitoring device that can measure the instanta-
neous voltage, current and frequency at specific locations on the grid. This gives operators a 
near-real-time picture of what is happening on the system, and allows them to make deci-
sions to prevent power outages.”). 
 65 CAMPBELL, SMART GRID & CYBERSECURITY, supra note 14, at 4-5. 
 66 DR. R. A. SHOURESHI ET AL., ELECT. POWER RES. INST., No. 1008821, INTELLIGENT 
SUBSTATION 3-1 (2003), 
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=00000000000100882
1 [hereinafter EPRI, INTELLIGENT SUBSTATION]. 
 67 USDOE, 2014 SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 37, at vi. 
 68 MURRILL, ET AL., supra note 60, at 1-2. 
 69 Illustrated Glossary: Transmission Lines, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/electric_power/illustrated_glossary/transmission_lines.h
tml (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). 
 70 See generally C. GELLINGS, ELEC. POWER RES. INST., No. 1022519, ESTIMATING THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE SMART GRID 5-1 (2011), 
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=00000000000102251
9 [hereinafter EPRI, ESTIMATING COSTS] (“The high-voltage transmission system is the 
“backbone” of the power delivery system.”). 
 71 See id. 
 72 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-926T, CYBERSECURITY: CHALLENGES IN 
SECURING THE ELECTRICITY GRID 15-16 (2012) [hereinafter GAO: CYBERSECURITY CHAL-
LENGES] (noting federal regulations largely govern transmission lines, however these lines 
could become blurred if additional technology such as “smart meters” are installed on con-
sumer homes and business, which interfere with distribution lines, systems, or equipment). 
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fore, much of the upgrade will involve running new electrical lines and simply 
installing new components at existing locations already owned or occupied by 
the electric grid.73 Lastly, the transmission lines are one of the vital parts of the 
electrical grid to preserve and revive because these lines and equipment are 
currently believed to be especially susceptible to cyberattacks.74 
III. CURRENT FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE 
ELECTRIC GRID 
A. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”) was the first 
significant piece of legislation to address the notion of a smart grid.75 Congress 
passed EISA with limited bipartisan support and President George W. Bush 
signed the bill into law on December 17, 2007.76 The newly passed legislation 
worked to establish new policy initiatives and reforms, such as increasing fed-
eral investments in alternative energy sources, phasing out traditional incan-
descent light bulbs, and raising vehicle fuel economy standards.77 Title XIII of 
EISA briefly described a broad public policy that sought the modernization of 
                                                
 73 Compare MURRILL, ET AL., supra note 60, at 7-13 (noting that 4th Amendment issues 
and questions of privacy arise) with GUO ET AL., supra note 40, at 39-41 (noting that trans-
mission and distribution lines are treated as public goods, but also acknowledging allocation 
of funding may be contentious, between government and non-government sources). 
 74 Cf. GAO, CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES, supra note 72, at 8 (“Threats to systems 
supporting critical infrastructure—which includes the electricity industry and its transmis-
sion and distribution systems—are evolving and growing.”); CAMPBELL, SMART GRID & 
CYBERSECURITY, supra note 14, at 21 (“The current Smart Grid cybersecurity discussions 
largely focuses on the security of central station power plants and transmission systems.”). 
 75 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 110 Pub. L. No. 140, 121 Stat. 1492 
(2007) (codified throughout 42 U.S.C.). 
 76 U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 110th Congress - 1st Session, U.S. SENATE (Dec. 13, 
2007), 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110
&session=1&vote=00430; FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 40, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REP. (Dec. 6, 2007), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll040.xml (recognizing support was 
mostly by Democratic members of Congress with some Republican member joining in); 
Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007 (Dec. 19, 2007) (on file with author) (“[Republican] President [George W.] Bush 
signed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.”). 
 77 See generally Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 110 Pub. L. No. 140, 
121 Stat. 1492 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (describing notable policy re-
forms in “TITLE I—ENERGY SECURITY THROUGH IMPROVED VEHICLE FUEL 
ECONOMY,” “TITLE III—ENERGY SAVINGS THROUGH IMPROVED STANDARDS 
FOR APPLIANCE AND LIGHTING,” [and] “TITLE VI—ACCELERATED RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT”). 
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America’s electrical power grid network.78 
Initially, EISA tasked the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) and its Of-
fice of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (“OD”) to help oversee ef-
forts to develop and establish a nationwide smart grid system.79 Congress cre-
ated two new collaborative organizations, “The Smart Grid Advisory Commit-
tee” and “The Smart Grid Task Force,” making the former responsible for es-
tablishing a technical framework to put into place and tasking the latter with 
disseminating information to third-party agencies within government and non-
government sectors.80 The newly formed organizations are complexly orga-
nized and require the involvement of members from the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (“NIST”), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).81 The 
remaining statutory provisions aimed to enact programs for the research and 
development of smart grid technologies,82 the development of a smart grid “in-
teroperability framework,”83 and the establishment of a grant program for smart 
                                                
 78 See id. § 1301, 42 U.S.C. § 17381. 
It is the policy of the United States to support the modernization of the Nation’s 
electricity transmission and distribution system to maintain a reliable and secure 
electricity infrastructure that can meet future demand growth and to achieve each of 
the following, which together characterize a Smart Grid: 
(1) Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve relia-
bility, security, and efficiency of the electric grid. 
(2) Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber-
security. 
(3) Deployment and integration of distributed resources and generation, including 
renewable resources. 
(4) Development and incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, 
and energy-efficiency resources. 
(5) Deployment of “smart” technologies (real-time, automated, interactive tech-
nologies that optimize the physical operation of appliances and consumer devices) 
for metering, communications concerning grid operations and status, and distribu-
tion automation. 
(6) Integration of “smart” appliances and consumer devices. 
(7) Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving 
technologies, including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal-
storage air conditioning. 
(8) Provision to consumers of timely information and control options. 
(9) Development of standards for communication and interoperability of applianc-
es and equipment connected to the electric grid, including the infrastructure serv-
ing the grid. 
(10) Identification and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to adop-
tion of smart grid technologies, practices, and services. 
Id. 
 79 Id. § 17382. 
 80 See id. § 17383. 
 81 See id.  §§ 17382, 17383. 
 82 See id. § 17384. 
 83 See id. § 17385(a) (outlining the need to develop protocols so that appliances and 
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grid investments.84 
B. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
While EISA established policy, subsequent appropriations helped make 
some parts of EISA’s public policy efforts a reality.85 Roughly a year later, 
Congress temporarily bolstered funding for smart grid initiatives in the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, otherwise known as “The Re-
covery Act.”86 The primary purpose of this legislation was to inject emergency 
government stimulus funding into the economy during the height of the Great 
Recession, rather than to modify federal energy policy in a substantial way.87 
The Recovery Act88 has been a meager victory for smart grid technology, and 
has helped to make initial progress in its implementation.89 However, the main 
goal of the Recovery Act was to “jumpstart” the economy, rather than a long-
                                                                                                             
other devices can communicate with the grid); see generally Christopher Bosch, Securing 
the Smart Grid: Protecting National Security and Privacy through Mandatory, Enforceable 
Interoperability Standards, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1349, 1353 (2014) (“[G]ranting the ap-
propriate regulatory entities the authority to develop and institute mandatory, enforceable 
interoperability standards is the most appropriate means to achieving effective Smart Grid 
cybersecurity.”). 
 84 See 42 U.S.C. § 17386(a). 
 85 See Federal Energy Requirements, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://www.epa.gov/greeningepa/energy/fedreq.htm; see also Omnibus Appropriations Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524 (2009). 
 86 See generally American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 405, 42 U.S.C. § 
17384; see also The Recovery Act, RECOVERY.GOV, 
http://www.recovery.gov/arra/About/Pages/The_Act.aspx (last visited on Apr. 9, 2014). 
On February 13, 2009, in direct response to the economic crisis and at the urging of 
President Obama, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009—commonly referred to as the “stimulus” or the “stimulus package.”) Four 
days later, the President signed the Recovery Act into law. The three immediate 
goals of the Recovery Act were: 
(1) create new jobs and save existing ones 
(2) spur economic activity and invest in long-term growth 
(3) foster unprecedented levels of accountability and transparency in government 
spending. 
Id. 
 87 See generally American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 405(1)(A). 
 88 See About the Recovery Act, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/recovery/about (last visited Aug. 20. 2015). 
 89 Silvio Marcacci, DOE Smart Grid Funds Created $6.8 Billion Economic Boost, 
47,000 Jobs, CLEAN TECHNICA (May 3, 2013), http://cleantechnica.com/2013/05/03/doe-
smart-grid-funds-created-6-8-billion-economic-boost-47000-jobs/ (“An analysis from the 
US Department of Energy (DOE), ‘Economic Impact of Recovery Act Investment in the 
Smart Grid,’ reports smart grid projects funded through the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act created nearly $7 billion total economic output, nearly 50,000 jobs, and over 
$1 billion in government tax revenue.”). 
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term funding source for smart grid implementation.90 
C. Presidential Policy Directive No. 21 & Executive Order 13636 
On February 12, 2013, President Barack H. Obama promulgated Presidential 
Policy Directive No. 21 relating to “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resili-
ence.”91 Presidential Policy Directives, sometimes referred to as “Presidential 
Directives,” are similar to an Executive Order, but are typically released in 
conjunction with the activities of the President’s National Security Council.92 
Presidential Policy Directive No. 21 was specifically issued to all vital and 
important forms of infrastructure and called for collaboration among the dif-
ferent levels of government to strengthen weaknesses within the various cur-
rent infrastructure systems.93 The initiative was designed to be a proactive ef-
fort, citing general physical and cyberattack threats against the dated national 
infrastructure.94 
This Directive reasserted DHS as the primary actor tasked with managing 
the security for all key areas of infrastructure, including “energy.”95 DHS’s role 
is two-fold: (1) to cure any points of vulnerability and (2) to facilitate coopera-
tion and information sharing between interested governments and agencies.96 
Meanwhile, the Directive restated the call for various agencies that handled 
infrastructure to research, plan, and develop security and resiliency plans to 
protect against both physical and cyber-threats.97 
President Obama, realizing that a Presidential Policy Directive alone was in-
sufficient, subsequently issued an accompanying Executive Order on the same 
subject matter only a week later, on February 19, 2013.98 Executive Order 
13636 largely restates Presidential Policy Directive No. 21, while also ordering 
                                                
 90 See generally The Recovery Act, supra note 86; see also Post-
Award/Closeout/Oversight, FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., 
http://www.fta.dot.gov/about/12835_9327.html (last visited Aug. 20. 2015). 
 91 Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infra-
structure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013) (on file with author), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil [hereinafter Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience]. 
 92 See generally Presidential Directives and Where to Find Them, LIB. OF CONG. (Oct. 
22, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/rr/news/directives.html. 
 93 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 91. 
 94 See id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.; see also CAMPBELL, SMART GRID & CYBERSECURITY, supra note 14, at 10, 15 
(noting the involvement of the Department of Homeland Security within electrical power 
grid, but citing to additional statutory authority for involvement within infrastructure). 
 97 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 91. 
 98 Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739 (Feb. 19, 2013). 
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various elements of the Executive Branch to undertake new and related duties 
as well as specifying personnel assignments and relevant logistics.99 
D. Subsequent Administrative Findings & Regulations 
There are few regulations in place regarding the implementation of, or 
standards for, the smart grid in the United States, especially at the federal lev-
el.100 Following EISA, many agencies were tasked with new assignments to 
promote the smart grid—but none have offered any solid regulatory guid-
ance.101 The few regulations that have emerged are a set of “voluntary stand-
ards” and measures that energy companies and state public utility commissions 
are encouraged, but not required, to adopt.102 These voluntary regulations im-
pede rapid development of the electrical grid.103 This is largely the result of the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005,104 which supported an industry model where energy 
companies were urged to self-regulate.105 However, self-regulated natural mo-
nopolies, such as electrical power companies, may become less inclined to in-
vest, modernize, and innovate when continuing with business as usual will 
maximize their earnings.106 As a result, and notwithstanding EISA, Presidential 
                                                
 99 Id. 
 100 See ASCE, 2013 REPORT CARD, supra note 7, at 63. 
 101 See, e.g., Availability of North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB) Smart 
Grid Standards as non-mandatory guidance, 18 C.F.R. § 2.27 (2015); U.S. DEP’T OF ENER-
GY, DATA PRIVACY AND THE SMART GRID: A VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT 1 (2015), 
http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/01/f19/VCC%20Concepts%20and%20Principl
es%202015_01_08%20FINAL.pdf; Federal Smart Grid Task Force, SMARTGRID.GOV, 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/federal_initiatives/federal_smart_grid_task_force/department_of
_homeland_security (last visited Apr. 9, 2015); GAO, CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES, supra 
note 72, at 6 (“As a result, any standards identified and developed through the NIST-led 
process are voluntary unless regulators use other authorities to indirectly compel utilities 
and manufacturers to follow them.”). 
 102 See Bosch, supra note 83, at 1377 (“In an industry as fast-moving as the Smart Grid, 
mandatory interoperability standards must be established early if they are going to be estab-
lished at all. Instead, a voluntary adoption regime persists to the potential detriment of citi-
zens and businesses.”). 
 103 See id. (“The separate regulatory relationship established between NIST and the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the EISA to implement interoperability 
standards is too burdensome and inactive to appropriately account for the fast-moving na-
ture of Smart Grid development.”). 
 104 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered 
sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
 105 Bosch, supra note 83, at 1377. 
 106 See generally TIMOTHY MOUNT, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 
IN DEREGULATED MARKETS FOR ELECTRICITY: A CASE STUDY OF NEW YORK STATE 9 (2007), 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/StudyMountEMRIreportNYISOCapacity09-07.pdf 
(“In a deregulated market, a large part of the net revenue earned above the operating costs is 
fungible and does not necessarily go toward the capital costs of generating capacity in a 
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Directive No. 21, or Executive Order 13636, has had little real development 
towards implementing a secure smart grid. While overly burdensome regula-
tion would be detrimental, a healthy balance of structured regulation and au-
tonomy must be achieved to encourage and incentivize the transition to a mod-
ern, smart grid system. 
IV. PROBLEMS AND FAILINGS OF THE SMART GRID UNDER THE 
CURRENT LAWS AND POLICIES 
A. No Overall Improvement 
Despite recently enacted laws, specialized taskforces, promulgated policy 
initiatives, and supposed redirection of time and funding, the smart grid is still 
largely a blueprint almost a decade after EISA. The American Society of Civil 
Engineers (“ASCE”), in their quadrennial 2013 Report Card for American In-
frastructure, gave the energy and electrical sector a “D+” letter grade.107 This 
score was identical to that in the 2009 Report Card for American Infrastruc-
ture, which strongly suggests that, at least from the perspective of this group, 
the overall status of the electrical power grid was no better than four years ear-
lier.108 This 2013 report made the following key findings: (1) the current system 
can usually handle current demand, but will face severe capacity issues as de-
mand and population are forecasted to increase; (2) the aging grid equipment 
has resulted in more service disruptions and cybersecurity vulnerabilities are 
becoming more of a risk; (3) there will be an “investment gap,” between fund-
ing needed and funding provided, if increased funding is not pursued.109 Mean-
while, the ASCE did note some gains made in the previous four years by high-
lighting increased availability of funding, but still questioned its future.110 
                                                                                                             
particular region.”). 
 107 ASCE, 2013 REPORT CARD, supra note 7, at 7, 10. 
About The Report Card: Methodology: The purpose of the 2013 Report Card for 
America’s Infrastructure is to inform the public of the current condition of Ameri-
ca’s infrastructure and to deliver the information in a concise and easily accessible 
manner. Using an easily understood school report card format, each of the 16 catego-
ries of infrastructure covered in the Report Card is assessed using rigorous grading 
criteria and the most recent aggregate data sources to provide a comprehensive as-
sessment of America’s infrastructure assets. 
Id. at 10. 
 108 Compare id. at 60, with AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS , 2009 REPORT CARD FOR AMERI-
CA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2009), 
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/2009/sites/default/files/RC2009_full_report.pdf. 
 109 ASCE, 2013 REPORT CARD, supra note 7, at 61-62. 
 110 Id. at 62-63. 
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Overall, the report labels the electrical grid “at risk,”111 inadequate for future 
demand,112 and a mismatched mix of equipment.113 
B. Losing Global Competitiveness 
International and global groups have also highlighted the inadequacy of 
America’s current grid. The World Economic Forum,114 in their 2008-2009 
report, ranked the United States electrical supply 16th place in the world.115 In 
the 2013-2014 report, America’s rank fell to 30th in the world.116 This strongly 
suggests that America is being outpaced by other nations as the quality of its 
electrical infrastructure continues to remain outdated and further deteriorates.117 
The data underlying this downward trend is both troubling and increasingly 
works to reveal the frailty of the nation’s currently existing grid. 
                                                
 111 See id. at 11, 60. 
 112 Id. at 61. 
 113 See id. at 60-61. 
 114 Our Mission, WORLD ECON. FORUM, http://www.weforum.org/world-economic-forum 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
The World Economic Forum was established in 1971 as a not-for-profit foundation 
and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. It is independent, impartial and not 
tied to any special interests, working in close cooperation with all major internation-
al organisations…[The World Economic Forum] engages political, business, aca-
demic and other leaders of society in collaborative efforts to improve the state of the 
world. Together with other stakeholders, it works to define challenges, solutions and 
actions, always in the spirit of global citizenship. 
Id. 
 115 KLAUS SCHWAB & MICHAEL E. PORTER, WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPET-
ITIVENESS REPORT 2008–2009, at 390 (2009), http://all4ed.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/01/globe.pdf [hereinafter WEF, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 
2008–2009]. 
 116 KLAUS SCHWAB. WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 
2013–2014: FULL DATA EDITION, at 438 (2014), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf [herein-
after WEF, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013-2014]. 
This year’s Report features a record number of 148 economies, and thus continues to 
be the most comprehensive assessment of its kind. It contains a detailed profile for 
each of the economies included in the study, as well as an extensive section of data 
tables with global rankings covering over 100 indicators. This Report remains the 
flagship publication within the Forum’s Global Competitiveness and Benchmarking 
Network, which produces a number of related research studies aimed at supporting 
countries in their transformation efforts. 
Id. at xiii. 
 117 Contra WEF, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2008-2009, supra note 116, at 390; 
see WEF, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013-2014, supra note 116, at 438. 
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C. Left in the Dark 
Blackout incidents and service downtimes have continued to increase over 
the past several years. Between 2007 and 2011, the number of service interrup-
tions has more than quadrupled,118 while the average total outage time also in-
creased from 104 minutes to 112 minutes per year.119 It is important to note, 
however, that disruption times vary widely across the nation.120 This has also 
increased the spending per customer by electric companies, which increased 
roughly ten percent between 2007 and 2011.121 
Outages and threats of outages have caused a sizable segment of homeown-
ers and businesses to invest in backup power generators, but only if they have 
the resources to do so.122 High profile, widespread outages—such as those 
caused by “Superstorm Sandy” in 2012123—has spurred a small economic 
boom in the home backup generator market in recent years.124 It is estimated 
that 1.25 million American households now have a permanent back-up genera-
tor connected to their home,125 while many more households are estimated to 
have smaller, portable electric generators.126 These are clear, unambiguous ef-
forts by consumers to bypass the electrical grid and its frequent, inconvenient 
outages. 
                                                
 118 See ASCE, 2013 REPORT CARD supra note 7, at 61 (“Significant power outages have 
risen from 76 in 2007 to 307 in 2011. Many transmission and distribution system outages 
have been attributed to system operations failures, although weather-related events have 
been the main cause of major electrical outages in the United States in the years 2007 to 
2012.”). 
 119 Jonathan Fahey, U.S. Power Grid Cost Rise, but Service Slips, YAHOO NEWS (Mar. 5, 
2013, 2:19 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/us-power-grid-costs-rise-144035112.html. 
 120 Amin, supra note 12, at 1 (“In an average year, outages total 92 minutes per year in 
the Midwest and 214 minutes in the Northeast.”). 
 121 See Fahey, supra note 119 (referencing chart within the article, which states that the 
average cost per customer in 2007 was just over $200 and by 2011 had risen to $232). 
 122 Ken Belson, Power Grids Iffy, Populous Areas Go for Generators, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
24, 2013, at F8 (“‘It’s not cheap, but people look at it as a home improvement product, par-
ticularly as they age,’ said Aaron Jagdfeld, the chief executive of Generac Power Systems, 
which recently produced its one-millionth standby unit. ‘People are coming to the conclu-
sion that power outages are becoming more frequent.’”). 
 123 See Hurricane Sandy Power Outage Map: Millions without Electricity on East Coast, 
HUFF. POST (Oct. 31, 2012, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/30/hurricane-sandy-power-outage-map-
infographic_n_2044411.html. 
 124 Bob Tita, A Sales Surge for Generator Maker, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2012, at B10. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Caroline Winters, Hurricane Sandy Boosts the Generator Makers, BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESSWEEK (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-11-05/hurricane-
sandy-boosts-the-generator-makers (“Only about 3 percent of U.S. homes currently have 
standby generators while about 15 percent have portables, according to Generac, which 
tracks industry sales, including those from competitors such as Briggs & Stratton [] and 
Kohler.”). 
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D. No Power, No Productivity 
Failure to improve and modernize the electrical grid has far reaching eco-
nomic implications. Blackouts and power disruptions siphon enormous 
amounts of money from the U.S. economy.127 Without electricity, manufactur-
ers are unable to make goods, retail outlets are unable to sell goods, companies 
are unable to render their services, and computer equipment and wireless net-
works cease all functionality.128 Experts have argued the economic impact 
might range somewhere between $80 billion to more than $164 billion.129 In the 
manufacturing and digital economic sectors, an hour-long outage costs approx-
imately $7,795 on average.130 Short, intermittent outages, which are more 
commonplace than prolonged outages, also cost money and harm productivity, 
but the exact amount is difficult to accurately estimate.131 These costs can be 
significantly curtailed with the implementation of the smart grid, which would 
be better able to handle outages, minimize impact, and reroute power around 
affected locations. 
E. Ineffective Oversight 
Since the passage of EISA in 2007, Congress has effectively taken a 
backseat role on infrastructure redevelopment and investment. While EISA 
                                                
 127 Fahey, supra note 119. 
 128 See, e.g., Tony Rhodin, 35 Lehigh Valley Mall Stores Closed by Power Outage, 
Spokesman Says, THE EXPRESS-TIMES, (Aug. 21, 2015, 6:11 AM), 
http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/lehigh-
county/index.ssf/2015/02/35_lehigh_valley_mall_stores_c.html (demonstrating that lack of 
electricity lead to retail stores being unable to sell goods and companies unable to render 
services). 
 129 See RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42696, WEATHER-RELATED 
POWER OUTAGES AND ELECTRIC SYSTEM RESILIENCY 8 (2012) [hereinafter CAMPBELL, POW-
ER OUTAGES] (using 2001 as the basis for estimates, unadjusted for inflation or current dol-
lar value); see also Smart Grid Overview, GEN. ELEC. DIG. ENERGY, 
http://www.gedigitalenergy.com/smartgrid_overview.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2015); see 
also Brad Plumer, Bad news: The U.S. Power Grid Is Getting Pricier, Less Reliable, WASH. 
POST: WONKBLOG (Mar. 8, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/08/surprise-the-u-s-power-
grid-is-getting-pricier-less-reliable/ (“Problems with the power grid now cost the economy 
some $150 billion per year.”). 
 130 CAMPBELL, POWER OUTAGES, supra note 129, at 7 (explaining these numbers were 
primarily from manufacturing and digital economy firms, but also adding that costs vary 
firm to firm, and noting that 5% of firms had a $20,000 cost or more for an hour-long out-
age). 
 131 See id. at 7-8 (explaining “even short duration outages of a few minutes could have 
large costs” for firms). 
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outlined a shell of a plan of action for infrastructure redevelopment,132 the Leg-
islative Branch has failed to establish any effective benchmarks for develop-
ment or effective oversight.133 Instead, EISA sketched a basic, broad public 
policy proposal and delegated assignments to various executive agencies and 
newly created collaborative organizations.134 While Congress has periodically 
requested various reports and updates, these have only shown mixed results in 
moving towards a smart grid.135 Nevertheless, Congress has neither reacted to 
this information nor proffered additional legislation to remedy this derailed 
attempt.136 
Since EISA’s passage, these newly formed organizations and various agen-
cies have conformed to the law;137 however, according to the Government Ac-
countability Office (“GAO”), progress in many areas has been challenging and 
lagging.138 The GAO proposes Congress consider additional legislation or regu-
lation to encourage and require a transition to a smart grid system, especially if 
existing agencies and entities cannot resolve coordination and regulation issues 
amongst themselves.139 The GAO has also pointed out that weak voluntary 
standards are also likely hindering progress towards a renewed and resilient 
electrical power system.140 The GAO has not been the only group to criticize 
this anemic progress; several academics have been skeptical as well.141 There-
fore, Congress ought to actively work to establish clear goals and create a co-
hesive framework to ensure that these goals are met. 
                                                
 132 See 42 U.S.C. § 17381 (comparing Title I with Title XII). 
 133 See id. § 17382 (2012) (observing no oversight requirement in Title XII). 
 134 See id. §§ 17381-17386. 
 135 See GAO, CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES, supra note 72, at 14-19. 
 136 See USDOE, 2014 SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 37, at 1 (noting under “Legisla-
tive Language” in this 2014 report only EISA of 2007). 
 137 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-117, ELECTRICITY GRID MODERNI-
ZATION 12-14 (2011) [hereinafter GAO, ELECTRICITY GRID MODERNIZATION]; see also 
GAO, CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES, supra note 72, at 5-6. 
 138 See GAO, ELECTRICITY GRID MODERNIZATION, supra note 137, at 26-28; see also 
GAO, CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES, supra note 72, at 14-18. 
 139 GAO, ELECTRICITY GRID MODERNIZATION, supra note 137, at 26-27 (“To the extent 
that FERC [or any other involved entity] determines it lacks authority to address any gaps in 
compliance that cannot be addressed through this coordinated approach with other regula-
tors, the Chairman should report this information to Congress.”). 
 140 See GAO, ELECTRICITY GRID MODERNIZATION, supra note 137, at 17-20; see also 
GAO, CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES, supra note 72, at 14-15. 
 141 See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain, Smart Grid Innovation: Policy, Politics and Law 5 (Nov. 
25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.crninet.com/2011/d14c.pdf; Bosch, supra 
note 83, at 1362, 1376-87; Ashira P. Ostrow, Grid Governance: The Role of a National 
Network Coordinator, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1993, 2026-30 (2014). 
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F. Who is In Charge Here? 
EISA does not task a single executive agency to take the lead effort to up-
grade and modernize the electrical power grid, which might explain why smart 
grid development has been so lethargic.142 The text of EISA establishes two 
commissions,143 and involves nearly a half dozen different agencies, including 
the DOE,144 DOE’s OD,145 DHS,146 NIST,147 and FERC.148 Adding to the already 
complicated framework, each agency must complete different assignments, 
and at some points, they report to the DOE,149 while at others they act autono-
mously.150 This mosaic of agencies and piecemeal delegation has been largely 
ineffective. Therefore, any viable solution must address this unsuccessful 
sketch of an organizational hierarchy. 
G. Risks Associated with a Piecemeal Electrical Grid 
The current electrical grid is a hodgepodge of systems, components, and 
parts that vary greatly in age—with modern equipment installed alongside 
equipment first installed in the 1960s.151 Older equipment, while outmoded, is 
still functional, and thus considered part of the “legacy system.”152 Elements of 
the legacy system are being slowly replaced as they break down, become unus-
able, or scheduled for upgrade.153 Meanwhile, other pieces are simply retrofit-
ted, essentially an old piece of equipment with modern technology added on 
that works to monitor the performance of the legacy component.154 This meth-
od is often pursued because it is cheaper than replacing the entire system, 
which often bears a significantly higher capital costs.155 
                                                
 142 See GAO, ELECTRICITY GRID MODERNIZATION, supra note 137, at 26-27. 
 143 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 17383 (establishing the Smart Grid Advisory Committee 
and Smart Grid Task Force). 
 144 See generally id. 
 145 Using the DOE acronym; however, note that the original EISA legislation refers to 
this office as “OEDER.” 
 146 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 17382. 
 147 See generally id. 
 148 See id. §§ 17382, 17383(b)(1). 
 149 See id. § 17384. 
 150 See generally id. §§ 17382, 17385. 
 151 See ASCE, FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 44, at 19; see also CAMPBELL, SMART GRID & 
CYBERSECURITY, supra note 14, at 2, 14. 
 152 See GUO ET AL., supra note 40, at 8-9 (noting that “legacy system” is a term applied to 
grid system components that are outmoded, but still functional and in place today). 
 153 See CAMPBELL, SMART GRID & CYBERSECURITY, supra note 14, at 6. 
 154 See id. at 6. 
 155 See id. 
Part of the delay has been due to the long-lived nature of the capital assets which 
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These retrofitted or partly-upgraded, half-measures are considered by ex-
perts to be both among the weakest points in the system, as well as the point at 
which equipment failure can occur.156 Typically, these retrofitted parts can 
meet capacity and basic functionality demands, but they often fail to meet cur-
rent cybersecurity standards.157 These jury-rigged systems are among the weak-
est links within the system, and ultimately can become a point of entry for 
hackers or malefactors.158 
H. Grid Integrity Issues 
The greatest threat to United States’ electrical grid, especially on a wide 
scale, is arguably infiltration and tampering by a hacker159—an eventuality that 
has yet to be satisfactorily addressed or protected against.160 Infrastructure has 
been attacked via malicious computer viruses and worms in the recent past—
the most infamous of which being the “Stuxnet” attack.161 Stuxnet was released 
in mid-2009 as a hybrid computer virus and worm that spread via self-
replication; its mission was to seek and sabotage specific Iranian computer 
equipment working on nuclear enrichment.162 Officially, it is unknown who 
                                                                                                             
make up the industry. The power plants and other expensive components of the grid 
can function for many productive years if maintenance of the systems is kept up. 
However, much of the delay in modernization has been due to cost concerns, as 
many electric utilities seek to manage expenses by delaying replacement of aging 
systems as long as possible. 
Id. 
 156 See id. at 14 (“Legacy devices and systems…may represent as much of a vulnerabil-
ity to cybersecurity as new Smart Grid components. They were not designed with cyberse-
curity in mind, and are often interconnected either via the Internet or by other, sometimes 
“unsecured” avenues.”). 
 157 See id. at 6 (“Some legacy grid devices are being retrofitted with communications 
capabilities to allow them functionality in the smarter grid, or permit easier maintenance, 
potentially introducing grid vulnerabilities which may not have existed before.”); see also 
NAT’L ELEC. MFRS. ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON CYBER SECURITY 4 (2010), 
https://www.nema.org/Policy/Energy/Smartgrid/Documents/Cyber_Security_Position_State
ment.pdf 
 158 CAMPBELL, SMART GRID & CYBERSECURITY, supra note 14, at 14. 
 159 See ZETTER, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO DAY, supra note 15, at 389. 
 160 See id. at 371. 
Just as we had failed in the past to invest in the physical infrastructure of our roads, 
bridges, and railways, we had failed to invest in the security of our digital infrastruc-
ture, [President] Obama said. Cyber intruders, he warned, had already probed our 
electrical grid, and in other countries had plunged entire cities into darkness. 
Id. 
 161 See id. at 387, 389. 
 162 Id. at 13-17 n.15, 28-31 (“The Siemens software that Stuxnet sought wasn’t just used 
in industrial plants, it was also used in critical infrastructure systems… Iran was about to 
open a nuclear reactor at Bushehr, in the south of the country, which had been a source of 
great tension with Israel and the West for a number of years.”). 
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unleashed Stuxnet.163 Although, it is widely speculated however, that Ameri-
ca’s National Security Agency and Israel collaborated to release this targeted 
virus.164 First discovered in June 2010, Stuxnet remains one of the most com-
plex computer viruses designed to date.165 Stuxnet utilized rare, previously un-
known vulnerabilities in Windows-operating computers and systems, called by 
experts “backdoors” or “zero days.”166 
Some have remarked Stuxnet marks “the first shot across the bow” ushering 
in the dawn of cyber-warfare,167 which could have huge ramifications and for-
ever change how war is waged and who ends up impacted.168 With Stuxnet out 
in the Internet, the fear is that the basic coding could be reprogrammed and 
retooled to target an array of infrastructure installations, including oil pipelines 
and electrical power grids, against any nation.169 Since Stuxnet, there have been 
several lesser-known viruses such as “Wiper”170 and “Flame,”171 which have 
also targeted Iranian nuclear development as well as its infrastructure.172 These 
                                                
 163 See id. at 31-32. 
 164 See id. at 30-31, 65-66, 247-48, 374. 
 165 Id. at 3, 5, 26. 
 166 Id. at 6. 
Zero-day exploits, however, aren’t ordinary exploits but are the hacking world’s 
most prized possession because they attack holes that are still unknown to the soft-
ware maker and to the antivirus venders—which means there are no antivirus signa-
tures yet to detect the exploits and no patches available to fix the holes they attack. 
Id. 
 167 Id. at 3. 
 168 Id. at 371-72, 377. 
Critical infrastructure has always been a potential target in times of war. But civilian 
infrastructure in the United States has long enjoyed special protection due to the 
country’s geographical distance from adversaries and battlefields. That advantage is 
lost, however, when the battlefield is cyberspace. In a world of networked comput-
ers, every system is potentially a front line. There is “no ‘protected zones’ or ‘rear 
areas’; all are equally venerable,” Gen[eral] Kevin Chilton, commander of the US 
Strategic Command, told Congress. 
Id. 
 169 Thomas Ricker, Stuxnet Source Code Could Open a Pandora’s Box of Cyberwarfare, 
THE VERGE (Mar. 5, 2012, 6:03 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/3/5/2845848/stuxnet-
source-code-opens-a-pandoras-box-of-cyberwarfare; see also ZETTER, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO 
DAY, supra note 15, at 388. 
 170 ZETTER, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO DAY, supra note 15, at 276-77 (“[A] virus began run-
ning wild on computers at the Iranian Oil Ministry and the Iranian National Oil Company, 
wiping out the hard drive of every system it touched.  The damage was systematic and com-
plete, destroying gigabytes of data at a time…Iranian officials dubbed it ‘Wiper’.”). 
 171 Id. at 280 (“[Flame] appeared to be a multipurpose espionage tool created to meet 
every need, depending on the mission…Each component was installed as needed…[from 
modules that were siphoning documents to one that was capturing keystrokes to another that 
was surreptitiously activating internal microphones to one that was secretly swiping periph-
eral devices’ data via Bluetooth].”). 
 172 Id. at 30-31 (“The attackers had to be aiming to steal intelligence about critical sys-
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forms of cyberattacks are arguably the greatest risk to the American electrical 
power grid, especially in the foreseeable future.173 
The physical security of the electrical grid is also immensely important. In 
the United States, there have been attempts by criminals to knock the electrical 
grid offline within smaller, localized areas by attacking substations serving a 
particular region or population.174 This becomes increasingly worrisome as 
some reports have stated power could be knocked out nationwide by simply 
targeting some nine critical locations across the United States.175 However, if a 
smart grid system were implemented, troubled areas might be better isolated 
and the power might be reroute around downed equipment and areas.176 This 
would mitigate the impact of power outages and could nearly eliminate the risk 
of widespread failures.177 
V. A NEW DIRECTION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Active Oversight by the U.S. Congress 
Congress needs to address four key issues related to smart grid implementa-
tion. First, Congress must draft new legislation regarding the implementation 
of smart grid development that places the DOE as the commanding and point 
agency overseeing this project. Second, Congress must continue to appropriate 
increased levels of funding as well as offer incentives to the utility companies, 
which would encourage wider and faster adoption of smart gird technologies. 
This funding would assist with subsidizing energy utility companies and their 
deployment of smart grid technology by focusing on replacing legacy equip-
                                                                                                             
tems, perhaps with strategic political importance to the region. The Siemens software that 
Stuxnet sought wasn’t just used in industrial plants, it was also used in critical infrastructure 
systems.”). 
 173 See id. at 389 (“‘We believe it is only a matter of time before the sort of sophisticated 
tools developed by well-funded state actors fund their way to groups or even individuals 
who in their zeal make some political statement do not know or do not care able collateral 
damage they inflict on bystanders and critical infrastructure,’ [Former NSA Chief, General 
Keith B. Alexander] said.”). 
 174 Rebecca Smith, Assault on California Power Station Raises Alarm on Potential for 
Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2014, at A8 (“The attack was ‘the most significant incident 
of domestic terrorism involving the grid that has ever occurred’ in the U.S., said Jon Wel-
linghoff, who was chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at the time.”). 
 175 See, e.g., id.; Davide Savenije & Ethan Howland, Could Terrorists Really Black Out 
the Power Grid?, UTIL. DIVE (March 24, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/could-
terrorists-really-black-out-the-power-grid/241192/. 
 176 GAO, ELECTRICITY GRID MODERNIZATION, supra note 137, at 4-6; see also PARFO-
MAK, supra note 13, at 6 (2014); see also GAO, CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES, supra note 
72, at 4-5. 
 177 See GAO, CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES, supra note 72, at 4-5. 
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ment that poses security risks to the grid, as a whole. Congress can also incen-
tivize development by offering low-to-no interest loans to companies purchas-
ing the equipment178 as well as favorable tax regulations that allow utilities to 
accelerate the depreciation and writing-off the equipment purchases.179 
Third, Congress must instruct its committees and subcommittees to take on 
a more active role in oversight and investigations of related issues. Specifical-
ly, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee180 and the Senate 
Committee on the Environment and Public Works181 ought be directed to main-
tain frequent oversight over smart grid implantation and make recommenda-
tions to Congress regarding any need for additional legislation that might help 
to foster this program. Further, these committees should seek the input of lead-
ing energy and technology experts, utility companies, consumers, and business 
owners to ensure this endeavor meets the vast majority of people’s needs. The 
goal of Congress’s involvement would be to ensure a smooth and effective 
transition towards a more reliable grid, while making reflective adjustments 
along the way, as needed. 
Fourth, Congress should place a sunset provision in any additional smart 
grid legislation passed, which would require renewed legislation after four 
years. Such a provision would ensure that Congress, as a whole, could main-
tain active and more effective oversight regarding the rollout smart grid de-
ployment and it forces Congress to address the issue of smart grid technology 
and its deployment more regularly. Such a measure would be beneficial over 
the next several years and could be phased out as substantial advancement is 
achieved. Lastly, this might prevent Congress from ignoring this issue for an-
other decade, without addressing key issues and changes in progress. 
                                                
 178 Cf. Cyndia Zwahlen, Expansion of Utilities’ Loan Program is Urged, L.A. TIMES, 
(May 5, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/05/business/fi-smallbiz5 (“California 
regulators want to expand a pilot program under which utilities offer interest-free loans to 
small businesses that want to buy energy-efficient gear.”). 
 179 See generally Ashlea Ebeling, Depreciation Tax Extenders Big Bonus for Business 
Owners, FORBES, (Dec. 18, 2014, 9:05 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2014/12/18/depreciation-tax-extenders-big-
bonus-for-business-owners (noting that President Obama signed tax extender legislation in 
order to continue “bonus depreciation” for businesses). 
 180 See generally History, H. TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE COMM., 
http://transportation.house.gov/about/history.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2015) (highlighting 
the committee’s history and oversight). 
 181 See generally History and Recent Membership of the Committee on Environment and 
Public Works, U.S. SEN. COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, 
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/committee-history-and-membership (last visit-
ed Oct. 24, 2015) (highlighting the committee’s history and oversight). 
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B. Actively Encouraging the Implementation of Smart Grid Technology 
Generally, it is appropriate for Congress to establish the broad public policy 
and allow for the related agencies to implement the logistics as they see fit.182 
However, with smart grids it might be wise to establish more specific goals. 
Congress therefore should set a firm deadline, by which a smart grid system 
will be substantially in place throughout the United States by the year 2030.183 
This would reaffirm Congress’s commitment to this program and firmly estab-
lish a timeline for implementation, especially since Congress has done this 
several times before.184 In EISA, it was required that incandescent light bulbs 
begin to be phased out starting in 2012;185 the law also dictated that vehicle fuel 
economy for automakers in the United States to achieve fleet-wide average of 
35.5 miles per gallon highway before 2016.186 While this might be perceived as 
a mere paper victory, stating a goal would serve as a resounding statement that 
Congress thinks our energy sector is a priority and will help to ensure a plat-
form for its remedy. 
                                                
 182 OFF. OF THE FED. REG., A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 2 (2011), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf. 
Agencies get their authority to issue regulations from laws (statutes) enacted by 
Congress. In some cases, the President may delegate existing Presidential authority 
to an agency. Typically, when Congress passes a law to create an agency, it grants 
that agency general authority to regulate certain activities within our society. Con-
gress may also pass a law that more specifically directs an agency to solve a particu-
lar problem or accomplish a certain goal. 
Id. 
 183 The term “substantially in place” is admittedly vague. This Comment hesitates to 
strictly define what level actually meets this threshold. Nevertheless, once a threshold is 
established, there are several ways this could be measures or evaluated: percentage of total 
population on smart grid technologies, percentage of overall miles of power lines, or ratio of 
new equipment installed and in use compared to remaining legacy equipment. It should be 
feasible to modernize at least 80% of the system over a 15-year period with aggressive, 
prioritized funding. 
 184 See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001); see also generally Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 49 U.S.C. §§ 
17001 et. seq. 
 185 Patrick J. Kiger, U.S. Phase-Out of Incandescent Light bulbs continues in 2014 with 
40-, 60-Watt Varieties, NAT’L GEO. (Dec. 31, 2013), 
http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2013/12/31/u-s-phase-out-of-incandescent-light-
bulbs-continues-in-2014-with-40-60-watt-varieties. 
 186 See JOSEPH DOOLEY, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DRIVING TO 54.5 MPG: A HISTORY OF 
FUEL EFFICIENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2012), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2014/06/02/FactSheet-Graphic-Fuel-Effiency-
Timeline-FINALSept-2012.pdf. 
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C. Command & Supervision by the U.S. Department of Energy 
The original congressional intent of EISA alluded that DOE ought to be in 
command of the several tasks related to this project.187 With DOE as the point 
agency, it would be in charge of overseeing and coordinating tasks for devel-
oping a better electrical grid, while still delegating various tasks and efforts out 
to specialty agencies.188 Such a simple restructuring could provide a clearer 
organizational layout, while offering a better command-and-control manage-
ment to encourage evolvement towards a resilient smart grid system.189 
Since DOE is a large government agency, it should specifically assign and 
refocus its OD to handle all federal smart grid efforts and projects. OD should 
house the two collaborative taskforces created by EISA, “The Smart Grid Ad-
visory Committee” and “The Smart Grid Task Force.” These restructured or-
ganizations within OD would ensure that DOE has effective management over 
the various other agencies involved, such as NIST, DHS, FERC, and other col-
laborative entities apart of either group. In this role, DOE, through OD, should 
have the authority to override any other agency in the event of conflicts related 
to smart grid issues. Similarly, the DOE needs to also have the capacity to 
make judgments when handling potentially conflicting recommendations. With 
this reestablished hierarchy, the DOE will be able to prioritize and manage 
smart grid modernization projects, while still seeking the expertise of other 
collaborative agencies. 
D. Hierarchy of Command 
Other than making the DOE the point agency, the remaining roles of subor-
dinate agencies should largely remain the same. NIST would be in charge of 
                                                
 187 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 17382-17386 (stating the Secretary and Advisory committees’ re-
sponsibilities and mission in implementing the program). 
 188 See Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/mission (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015) (quoting the DOE’s mission, which presents an informal goal as to “[e]stablish an 
operational and adaptable framework that combines the best wisdom of all Department 
stakeholders to maximize mission success.”). 
 189 See IAN BUCHANAN ET AL., BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, MANAGEMENT SPANS AND LAY-
ERS: STREAMLINING THE OUT-OF-SHAPE ORGANIZATION 3 (2003), 
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/missiondna-management-spans-and-layers.pdf. 
In an environment of ever-escalating efficiency, effectiveness, and performance re-
quirements, public sector organizations need to be fit and flexible to prosper. Too 
many, however, are burdened with a cumbersome organizational structure. Develop-
ing a flattering and more streamlined profile is not only a key to driving greater effi-
ciency in the short term but also an invitation to enhancing mission effectiveness 
over the longer haul. 
Id. 
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establishing related measurements and standardizations needed for effective 
operation of a smart grid. NIST ought to prioritize working on interoperability 
standards, as it would establish a uniform language to allow various parts of 
the grid to effectively communicate to each other.190 FERC would work with 
the several states as well as energy and utility companies in implementing ef-
fective, binding regulations.191 Meanwhile, DHS should remain tasked with the 
duty to ensure physical security as well as the cybersecurity of the grid.192 Out-
sourcing highly specialized and technical jobs to agencies that have expertise is 
proper and helps to ensure more effective outcomes and ought to yield much 
better results. 
VI. OUTLOOK 
A. The Economics of Smart Grid Technology & Energy Redevelopment 
The economics of implementing smart grid technology are extremely im-
pressive, all around. Most infrastructure development is marked by high up-
front capital costs.193 Electrical power components, power plants, substations, 
and power lines are no exception.194 Legislation like the Recovery Act has 
helped to make some initial strides in electricity reinvestment and development 
efforts, but much more is still needed.195 Recent total spending levels by inves-
                                                
 190 See generally Bosch, supra note 83, at 1377 (“While all interoperability standards 
remain voluntary, utilities will continue to pick and choose what standards to abide by, often 
opting for minimum security to save money.”). 
 191 See id. at 1378-79. 
 192 See Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 91. 
 193 See generally Tracy Gordon & David Schleicher, High Costs May Explain Crumbling 
Support for U.S. Infrastructure, REAL CLEAR POL’Y (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://www.realclearpolicy.com/blog/2015/03/31/high_costs_may_explain_crumbling_supp
ort_for_us_infrastructure_1249.html (“Put bluntly: the costs of U.S. infrastructure are too 
damn high.”). 
 194 See Electricity Transmission, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Sept. 2, 2014), 
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tor-owned entities on the electrical power grid averaged about $25.5 billion per 
year, excluding the cost of building power generation facilities;196 transmission 
lines alone cost, on average, between $10 and $17 billion annually.197 Further-
more, cybersecurity for smart grid technology in North America between 2010 
and 2015 was projected to cost approximately $1.5 billion, a number that is 
projected to increase much higher in the years ahead.198 
Transition to a smart grid would be able to better adapt and meet the needs 
of a modern America. The Electric Power Research Institute (“EPRI”) esti-
mates an additional $17 and $24 billion will be needed annually over the next 
two decades to bring a smart grid system to flourishing.199 The total net invest-
ment is projected to run somewhere between $338 billion and $467 billion.200 
The transmission lines segment of the electrical power grid is forecasted to 
cost approximately $56 billion to $64 billion alone, according to EPRI.201 Cy-
bersecurity costs are projected to cost approximately 15% of total costs of up-
grading the system.202 While these numbers are considerably high, the likely 
return on investment is even more awe-inspiring. 
Some have called this endeavor as the program that “cost billions, but saves 
trillions.”203 While monumental costs as high as $476 billion are nothing to 
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scoff at, the estimated return on investment is much greater—up to nearly five-
times greater, overall. EPRI estimates that America could reasonably expect to 
see a “consumer benefit” of $1.294 trillion upwards to $2.028 trillion, over a 
20-year period with additional benefit and value for decades to follow.204 Even 
if the conservative estimates ring true, that is still more than a $2 return in val-
ue for each and every dollar spent, which would have an excellent impact na-
tionwide. 
The smart grid transition will be a major stimulus program, both building 
the value of the nation as well as the associated economic spending. The Re-
covery Act included provisions to infuse stimulus money to modernize various 
grid projects.205 As an element of the stimulus funding, the U.S. Government 
spent approximately $4.5 billion in “electricity delivery and energy reliability 
modernization,” which was matched by $5.5 billion which was contributed 
from local agencies and the private sector;206 these matching funds went to-
wards implementing some smart grid and energy storage technologies, with 
additional funding allocated for workforce training.207 
Implementing President Obama’s Policy Directive No. 21, as well as the 
specifics outlined in EISA, would be felt throughout the nation’s economy and 
could cause an industry boom. Many companies would be needed for software 
development, equipment and component manufacturing, delivery, installation, 
and maintenance of these new technologies.208 Currently, huge multinational 
companies like General Electric, Microsoft, Google, and Siemens are already 
beginning to vie to be a part of this revolution.209 Furthermore, new and experi-
enced workers alike will need to be trained on these new technologies;210 esti-
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mates state smart grid initiatives could create over 210,000 jobs nationwide 
just for utility worker jobs to run and install power lines.211 
Lastly, there is another secondary mission of smart grid implementation—
reassert America’s global economic competitiveness. With renewed electrical 
systems, America would be able to excel again on a global scale. Modern busi-
nesses demand an environment where utilities are advanced and can provide 
clean, uninterrupted service to commercial and industrial consumers.212 With 
the addition of reliable smart grid technology, America can rise once again in 
various global economy competitiveness rankings and be used as a selling 
point as to why a company should establish their businesses here in the United 
States.213 The American economy can regain lost productivity and grow the 
nation’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) just by becoming more efficient. 
B. Potential Issues & How to Minimize Their Impact 
1. Too Broad and Mission Creep 
Since the start of the 114th Congress, there have already been at least four 
bills introduced relating to smart grid technology and energy infrastructure 
redevelopment.214 However, these bills in their current form will not be suc-
                                                                                                             
The utility work force is undergoing a significant challenge. One-half of the [cur-
rent] 500,000 to 600,000 utility workers will be eligible to retire in the next five 
years. They need to be replaced with a trained and motivated work force. Introduc-
ing Smart Grid technologies requires employees with different skills to support the 
implementation, maintenance, and operation of the systems with digital components. 
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cessful in achieving the goals advocated by this Comment because they are too 
broad and open the possibility of mission creep, which occurs when a cam-
paign is not carefully limited and slowly shifts or expands its scope outward.215 
To achieve effective change, any legislation considered must focus on the nar-
row issue of smart grid deployment and its funding. It might be advisable to 
breakdown reinvestment by stage, beginning with transmission and distribution 
lines and then turn to building new power plants or the rollout of smart meters. 
2. Institutional Resistance 
Energy companies, utilities, and grid operators might be resistant to the gov-
ernment trying to get involved. These entities likely see the government as in-
trusive, burdensome, or even the start down a road filled with many new ardu-
ous regulations.216 However, energy companies ought to be open to this form of 
government involvement because the smart grid will benefit both the nation as 
well as the energy companies. Smart grid technology could ultimately mean 
that providers can charge more money for the energy delivered, but produce 
less power, reducing overall wasted energy and lowering maintenance costs.217 
While consumers will not be thrilled to learn that they will have to pay more 
for electricity—nearly double by 2050—the smart grid is cheaper than the al-
ternative.218 If the current system endures without modernization, electricity 
prices are expected to increase six-fold by 2050.219 Ultimately, it becomes a 
win-win situation with the deployment of smart grid systems for consumers 
and providers alike. 
3. Who Foots the Bill? 
Who pays the bill? The answer: the American people will ultimately bank-
roll this project. The real question is: “How?” The first option is regulating and 
requiring energy companies to make various changes on their own, while 
meeting stringent government standards. In pursuing this first option, Ameri-
cans will face steeply increasing electricity bills from the onset. The second 
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option is that government carries the costs of modernization; however, this 
would result in higher taxes or increased deficit spending to support this en-
deavor. A third option would be a hybrid approach, which is largely what has 
been followed since the enactment of the Recovery Act and its stimulus spend-
ing since 2009. 
Realistically, a hybrid approach is probably the best scenario for rolling out 
the smart grid fairly quickly. The DOE and its entities distribute funding 
through grants and various public works projects.220 This has been effective in 
injecting money to cover the costs of upgrading systems, but at current spend-
ing levels it would take decades to complete a total overhaul of the current grid 
system.221 Much too slow and improvement might be outpaced and over-
whelmed by forecasted for increased demand over the next decade.222 There-
fore, if America continues to use this hybrid option, they would be advised to 
both increase government spending on this program, while strongly encourag-
ing the utilities to do the same to meet a 2030 deadline. 
C. The Current Sociopolitical Climate: Ripe for Readdressing 
America wants infrastructure investment and redevelopment. Energy and 
grid development is frequently cited as important for continued investment and 
improvement.223 Businesses cite infrastructure reliability as a key consideration 
in choosing where a business should be established, expanded, and operated in 
a given locale.224 Businesses and the United States Chamber of Commerce have 
petitioned America, Congress, and the White House to move towards a smart 
grid as well as investment in infrastructure generally.225 Even labor unions have 
joined the same side as business owners—in a rare partnership—declaring that 
infrastructure development would create good jobs and strengthen the job mar-
ket for workers.226 Citizens have also become aware of America’s weakening 
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energy grid, as it has risen among American’s top issues of concern.227 Ameri-
cans are becoming increasingly frustrated with electrical outages—from both 
short and intermittent to prolonged outages.228 
Smart grid and energy investment can be a bipartisan political issue and can 
be presented as a “purple issue,” where Republican and Democrats should to 
be able to find a solid middle ground.229 Several Democrats230 have called for 
various energy grid reforms, as have many Republicans.231 Within the recently 
installed 114th Congress, many polarizing and contentious issues have been 
ruled out due to the high tensions and a divided government.232 Nevertheless, 
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infrastructure redevelopment and related policies can realistically bridge this 
divide.233 Redevelopment would improve the quality of American Life, while 
stimulating a sputtering economy and creating new jobs.234 Infrastructure is not 
a wasted expenditure; rather, it is an investment in America’s future.235 Since 
elements, inter alia distribution power lines, power plants, seaports, and road-
ways, are used every day and can endure decades into the future, they offer 
great long-term benefits to their communities and the nation as a whole.236 
D. A Model for the Future 
Successful transition and implementation of smart grid technology could be-
come a model for other developmental endeavors. There are several elements 
of America’s infrastructure in need of critical repairs.237 Many of America’s 
water pipes have frequently seen a century of use.238 Meanwhile, the nation’s 
seaports and airports are showing their age and capacity issues.239 Roads, high-
ways, and bridges, too, are in a poor state; many bridges are far-exceeding de-
sign capacity and are now “structurally deficient.”240 In ASCE’s 2013 Report 
Card for American Infrastructure, America received an overall grade of 
“D+.”241 Nevertheless, if this Comment’s recommendations are ultimately 
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While the modest progress is encouraging, it is clear that we have a significant back-
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adopted, perhaps smart grid and energy investment could serve as a rudimen-
tary model for additional infrastructure revitalization projects. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
If the United States of America pursues a serious reinvestment plan, then 
smart grid has the potential to be the largest undertaking in public works initia-
tive since the creation of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Interstate High-
way System,242 and has the potential to improve the economy like President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Works Progress Administration243 during the 
Great Depression. While the costs could be undeniably high, the costs of 
America doing nothing would be even higher.244 According to estimates from 
multiple sources, energy grid developments are projected to more than pay for 
itself.245 Dubbed as the program that “costs billions and saves trillions,”246 the 
real question is can America afford to forgo this endeavor? America cannot 
continue to mortgage its future and neglect our nation’s energy grid, especially 
if it hopes to remain a leading world power. A leading, industrial nation cannot 
have the floundering infrastructure of a developing country. 
There is too much at stake, which impacts our economy, convenience, life, 
and safety. The current grid is susceptible to attack on several fronts, from acts 
of nature to decades-old equipment failing to malicious computer hackers, both 
at home and abroad. While blackouts and service disruptions cannot be com-
pletely eliminated, such events can be isolated, minimized, and possibly pre-
vented with a reactive smart grid system. This issue is ripe for readdressing in 
this current sociopolitical climate as an issue, which can easily be presented 
and adopted as a nonpartisan issue that helps America to help itself. A 21st cen-
tury America must not rely on a power grid largely unchanged from that of the 
19th century. America, let’s get smart and work together towards investing in 
America’s infrastructure. We owe it to ourselves and future generations. 
                                                                                                             
log of overdue maintenance across our infrastructure systems, a pressing need for 
modernization, and an immense opportunity to create reliable, long-term funding 
sources to avoid wiping out our recent gains. Overall, most grades fell below a C, 
and our cumulative GPA inched up just slightly to a D+ from a D four years ago. 
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